Curbing the Labor Market Divide by fostering Inclusive Labor Markets through a Job Guarantee Scheme by Klosse, Saskia & Muysken, Joan
  
 
Curbing the Labor Market Divide by  fostering
Inclusive Labor Markets through a Job Guarantee
Scheme
Citation for published version (APA):
Klosse, S., & Muysken, J. (2016). Curbing the Labor Market Divide by  fostering Inclusive Labor Markets
through a Job Guarantee Scheme. Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management , 4(2),
185-219. https://doi.org/10.22381/PIHRM4220168
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2016
DOI:
10.22381/PIHRM4220168
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 185 
 
 
 
Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management  
4(2), 2016, pp. 185–219, ISSN 2332-399X, eISSN 2377-0716  
 
CURBING THE LABOUR MARKET DIVIDE BY  
FOSTERING INCLUSIVE LABOUR MARKETS  
THROUGH A JOB GUARANTEE SCHEME  
 
SASKIA KLOSSE 
s.klosse@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
Faculty of Law,  
Maastricht University 
JOAN MUYSKEN 
j.muysken@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
(corresponding author)  
School of Business and Economics,  
Maastricht University;  
UNU-MERIT   
 
ABSTRACT. Globalization, demographic trends and technological developments pose 
important challenges to European labor markets: job quality has deteriorated and  
precariousness has increased. Austerity measures enforced after the financial crisis 
have aggravated this trend. We argue that there is a case for appropriate active  
inclusion policies, complemented by stimulating macroeconomic policies. Using de- 
scriptive statistics and a systematic review of the literature, we propose to experiment 
with Job Guarantee (JG) projects. These projects could provide a macroeconomic 
stimulus to the economy by enabling everybody who is willing to work to take up a 
JG job at the minimum wage. Job guarantee projects are not a panacea to all evils. 
But experience shows that they could help to stop the casualization of the labor  
market by providing quality jobs and sustainable employment opportunities. As such, 
JG projects could foster inclusive labor markets. The projects should be financed by 
redirecting social security (administration) funds, by including JG elements in the  
European Investment Plan and by using part of the €80 billion which the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is injecting each month in the euro area. Our proposal aims to 
curb the labor market divide by making labor markets more “inclusive” through a 
solid Job Guarantee scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The combination of globalization, demographic trends and technological 
developments pose important challenges to European labor markets. In many 
European countries flexible employment patterns have become a dominant 
feature, leading to a growing number of people for whom flexible work,  
part-time work or self-employment is the only way to participate in the labor 
market. At the same time, the quality of jobs has deteriorated and precarious- 
ness has increased. Austerity measures enforced after the financial and 
economic crisis seem to have aggravated this trend. In this article we argue 
that there is a case for appropriate active inclusion policies, fostered by a Job 
Guarantee scheme and complemented by stimulating macroeconomic policies.  
We share the widespread concern about the persistence of poverty and 
joblessness leading to apprehension about sustainable employment in the 
European Union. In that light the European 2020 Strategy moved the creation 
of more and better jobs and greater social cohesion to the top of the agenda, 
thereby emphasizing the importance of active policies to promote smart, sus- 
tainable and inclusive growth (COM 2010, 2020 and COM 2012, 173 final). 
Also the OECD is worried about labor market performance and wellbeing. 
In fact, the major part of its annual Labour Employment Outlook is devoted 
to questions presented in chapter titles like “Sharing the pain equally?”  
(OECD, 2014, Ch. 2), “How good is your job?” (OECD, 2014, Ch. 3), and 
the “labor market divide” (OECD, 2014, Ch. 4). 
To illustrate these concerns we show in section 2 how over time the labor 
market situation in the European Union has deteriorated in terms of providing 
sustainable employment and better quality jobs. Although labor market par- 
ticipation has increased, in particular due to higher participation of women, 
this was mostly in low quality jobs. Moreover unemployment increased 
sharply after the crisis starting in 2008. The incidence of low quality jobs 
and unemployment is especially high among certain groups (youngsters and 
low education persons) and in some countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain). Inclusive activation policies, leading to sustainable employment 
and better jobs, therefore are warranted. 
We associate in section 3 the concern for inclusive activation policies with 
the notion of full employment which was dominant in the first decades after 
WWII in all European countries. We show how after the reforms in the 
1980s this notion was replaced by the notion of “full employability,” leading 
to less concern for the quality of jobs and to in-work poverty. The current 
policy stance on active inclusion is somewhere in between both notions. 
Moreover due to the financial crisis and the austerity measures, active  
inclusion policies seem to have stagnated. Both observations induce us to 
argue in favor of experimenting with a Job Guarantee Scheme as a leap 
forward to restore full employment. 
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In section 4 we further develop the idea of introducing Job Guarantee 
Experiments with the aim to secure the availability of good quality jobs at 
the minimum wage level for all those who are able and willing to work. First 
we briefly discuss (positive) experiences with existing job guarantee  
programs, in particular in Argentina, India and the Netherlands and with the 
EU Youth Guarantee Scheme. We then propose to implement job guarantee 
experiments in the EU, thereby stressing the context of sustainable employ- 
ment with quality jobs, consistent with the earlier introduced notion of full 
employment. Finally we argue that job guarantee experiments can be partly 
financed by redirecting social security (administration) funds and by including 
job guarantee elements in the European Investment Plan (also known as the 
Juncker Plan). We point out that this is a very good way to spend part of the 
€80 billion which the ECB injects each month in the euro area. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Challenges for an Inclusive European Labor Market 
 
For obtaining full sustainable employment at least three preconditions need 
to be fulfilled. We will use these preconditions as backbone for our analysis 
of the challenges EU Member States are facing in terms of realizing inclusive 
labor markets. The first precondition is that persons have to be willing to look 
for a job. This shows up in the activity rate which we discuss in section 2.1. 
Second persons have to find a job. For that reason we look at the unemploy- 
ment rate in section 2.2. Finally the jobs should lead to sustainable employ- 
ment, that is, employment “promoting quality jobs and preventing in-work 
poverty” and “helping people stay in work and advance in their careers.”1 
Sustainable employment and the nature of jobs are discussed in section 2.3. 
In our discussion we focus on the EU15 since for this group of countries 
data are available for a longer period (since 1995). For individual countries 
we compare the EU12, since for these countries data are available in most 
cases since the mid 1980s.2 Moreover, this group of countries covers the four 
types of welfare states distinguished in Urbé (2012, Ch. 1): the liberal  
“Beveridge” system (with Ireland and the UK), the conservative, corporatist 
“Bismarck” system (with  Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and, to a 
certain extent, the Netherlands), the social democratic or Scandinavian  
(Nordic) regime (with Denmark) and the “Mediterranean” Model which puts 
a larger burden of the social well-being on the family (with Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain).  
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2.1 Labor force participation 
 
From Figure 1 one sees how the rate of labor force participation has been 
steadily increasing in the EU15, from 67% in 1995, of the population aged 
15–64 years, to 73% in 2013. As is illustrated in Figure 2, the variation across 
countries is quite large in the EU12: It ranges from 63% in Italy in 2013 to 
almost 80% in the Netherlands. Moreover, compared to 1986 participation 
did hardly increase in Italy, whereas it increased dramatically in the Nether- 
lands and in Spain – by almost 20% in both countries. 
 
                        Figure 1 Labor force participation and employment 
                                        in EU15, 1995–2013 
 
 
                         Figure 2 Activity rates of the EU12, 1986–2013 
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Figure 3 Reasons for inactivity in EU15, 1996–2013 
 
 
                                Figure 4 Reasons for inactivity in EU12, 2013 
 
 
From Figure 3 one sees that the main reason for inactivity is education. The 
higher incidence of this reason since the economic crisis in 2008 is consistent 
with the notion that more young persons are extending their education in a 
situation of increasing unemployment (ILO, 2012). The second reason for 
inactivity is family-related, like looking after a child or dependent family 
member. The impact of this reason has declined systematically, reflecting an 
increasing participation of women on the labor market (often in part time 
work) – see Appendix A1. The impact of the third reason, early retirement, 
has decreased – this is consistent with increased labor participation of the age 
group 55–64 (Appendix A1). Finally, illness and disability have increased 
systematically as a reason for inactivity, with a small jump after the financial 
crisis. 
The incidence of inactivity in the EU15 amongst educational groups is  
shown in Appendix A1. The high rate of inactivity amongst low educated 
persons is striking: labor force participation is less than 60%, almost 20% 
below that of medium educated persons.3 Surprisingly enough, this phenom- 
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enon is also observed amongst the young, aged 15–24. Finally, the country 
of birth has a low impact on labor force participation, as can be seen from 
Appendix 1. 
The incidence of reasons for inactivity shows a large variation across  
countries as appears from Figure 4 (see also Appendix A2).  Education is the 
dominant reason in all countries, except in the Netherlands, and has been 
increasing. Family reasons are above 20% in Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and Spain, but below 10% in the Netherlands, Portugal, France and Denmark. 
Retirement is above 20% in France and Greece, but below 10% in Ireland 
and Spain. The largest variation is found in illness and disability as a reason 
for inactivity, varying from over 30% in the Netherlands and Denmark, over 
20% in the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain, to far below 10% in  
Greece and Italy. Moreover the incidence of this reason has increased in all 
countries except the United Kingdom and Luxemburg.  
When analyzing the reasons of inactivity no explicit attention is paid to 
the so-called discouraged worker effect. This is remarkable in view of the 
fall in the employment rate after the financial crisis in 2008 (see Figure 1).  
The increase in unemployment rates corresponds to a clear slow-down in the 
increase of the activity rate: Whereas it increased by 2.2% in the five years 
prior to the financial crisis, it increased by 0.9% only afterwards. The strong 
increase in unemployment after the financial crisis probably discouraged 
many potential job-seekers to enter the labor market (Watt, 2013; Christl and 
Kucsera, 2014).  
 
2.2 Unemployment 
 
As is well-known unemployment in Europe has risen dramatically in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. In the EU15 unemployment decreased after 
the recession in the early 1990s from almost 11 to 7% in 2000, after which it 
remained stable till 2007 – see Figure 5. However, after the financial crisis in 
2008 it rose sharply to a level above 11% in 2013. As can be seen from Figure 
5 the rate of long-term unemployment also increased, even stronger than 
proportional.  
In Appendix B we show some figures to illustrate that the unemployment 
incidence is higher amongst foreigners and young persons: in 2013 unem- 
ployment in EU 15 amongst the age group 15–24 was 32% for foreigners 
compared to 23% for the total, and unemployment amongst foreigners in 
general was 18% compared to 11% for total unemployment. There are no 
clear gender differences in unemployment. 
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                      Figure 5 Unemployment in EU15, 1995–2013 
 
 
                      Figure 6 Unemployment in EU12, 1986–2013 
 
 
One observes from Figure 6 that there is a large variation in unemployment 
across countries after the financial crisis,4 compared to a much smaller 
variation just before the financial crisis. In particular Spain and Greece are 
severely affected, with unemployment rates above 25% in 2013. The dramatic 
increase in unemployment in the so-called GIISP countries after the financial 
crisis (doubling in Italy and Portugal and tripling in Ireland, Spain and 
Greece) is in our view an indication that the main cause of unemployment is 
demand deficiencies imposed by austerity measures (Stiglitz et al., 2014; de 
Grauwe and Ji, 2015), rather than labor market rigidities, as the dominant 
view suggests.5 As we will argue below, this has important implications for 
the inclusive labor market policies. 
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2.3 Sustainable employment and quality of jobs 
 
As we mentioned in the introduction, a third precondition for realizing inclu- 
sive labor markets is the availability of sustainable employment and reason- 
able working conditions. We briefly analyze below the incidence of temporary 
employment, self employment and part-time employment, since they feature 
higher job insecurity and may hamper sustainable employment. We also 
consider the quality of jobs in the EU12 as represented by “in work at risk of 
poverty” and “physical and mental wellbeing at work.”  
Temporary work is an important threat to sustainable employment (OECD, 
2014: 143).6 Yet, the incidence of temporary work has increased in the EU15 
from just above 11% in 1995 to 15% in 2005 – see Figure 7. After the 
financial crisis it stabilized around 14%. In Appendix C we show that there is 
a strong variety across the EU12 countries, with an incidence of above 20% in 
2013 in Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. In 2013 less than 20% of the 
temporary workers in the EU15 indicates that temporary work is a voluntary 
choice and over 60% indicates that they accepted temporary work because 
they could not find a better job – see Figure 8.7 Finally, OECD (2014: 143) 
notes that these jobs “are still disproportionately held by younger, less -
educated and lower-skilled workers.” 
 
Figure 7 Temporary and self-employment in EU15, 1995–2013 
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               Figure 8 Reasons for temporary employment 1996–2013 in EU12 
 
 
As appears from Figure 7, self-employment is also an important phenomenon 
in the EU15, representing about 14% of total employment. A substantial part 
of these self-employed consists of so-called own-account workers. However, 
the data are quite unreliable and provide an underestimation of their true 
number (OECD, 2014, Ch. 4) – we present these data for the EU12 countries 
in Appendix C – this shows that its incidence generally increased after the 
financial crisis. There are no further data available at European level to ana- 
lyze the employment perspectives for this group in more detail,8 but as OECD 
(2014) observes this category of workers has de facto the lowest degree of 
job protection of all dependent workers. As they “are not employees, the  
labor standards or other protection conferred by labor law, are not normally 
applicable to them” (OECD, 2014: 169).  
A final threat to sustainable employment is the increasing incidence of 
part-time work – see Figure 7. It is generally recognized that part-time work 
goes hand in hand with higher labor market insecurity (OECD, 2014, Ch. 3). 
It also can be involuntary since part-time persons might want to work longer 
hours than available on the job. One sees from Figure 8 that almost one third 
of the workers in EU15 indicate that part-time work has been accepted 
because no full-time job was available. This is probably an underestimation 
since part-time work due to “care” will be influenced by the availability of 
child-care facilities. The importance of “care” and “other family respon - 
sibilities” as reasons for part-time employment is consistent with the high 
incidence of female part-time workers as appears from Figure 7. 
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                    Figure 9 Part-time employment in EU15, 1995–2013 
 
 
                      Figure 10 Reasons for part-time unemployment, 
                                        1995–2013 in EU12 
 
 
Turning to the quality of jobs, one of the indicators used by Eurostat is the 
so-called in work at risk of poverty, which is the share of persons who are at 
work and have an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold.9 This share increased for the EU15 from 7.5% in 2005 to 8.6% in 
2013. The variety of the share amongst the EU12 countries is large. One sees 
from Figure 11 that Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are amongst the five 
countries with a share above 10% in 2013. Hence in these countries at least 
one out of ten persons who have a job, are at risk of poverty. 
Another indication of the quality of jobs is negative wellbeing at work, 
measured by the share of persons reporting exposure to factors that can ad- 
versely affect physical or mental well-being. The results presented in Figure 
12 for the EU12 are quite surprising, since not only the GIIPS countries score 
high on this list, but also the UK, the Netherlands and in particular France. 
We could not find a precise reason for this result. However, excluding the 
outlying result for France, the average reported negative wellbeing for the 
EU27 was 35% in 2007 for physical reasons and 23% for mental reasons. 
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Figure 11 In work at risk of poverty in EU12, 2005–2013 
 
 
                     Figure 12 Negative wellbeing at work in EU12, 2007 
 
 
OECD (2014) devotes a long chapter to the assessment of job quality, where 
three dimensions are distinguished: earnings quality, labor market security and 
quality of the work environment. Two interesting findings are that “across 
countries it does not appear to be the case that better job quality is achieved 
at the cost of fewer jobs. Countries that perform well in terms of overall job 
quality also tend to perform well on job quantity (as measured by the em- 
ployment rate), and vice versa” (81). […] “The worst off are youth and low-
skilled workers. They cumulate poor performance in terms of employment 
rates with poor outcomes along all three dimensions of job quality. […] 
Temporary employment contracts are associated with lower job quality in all 
three dimensions” (81–82). 
      Looking at the GIISP countries compared to the EU12 we derive from 
the OECD findings that Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy have the highest job 
insecurity (OECD, 2014, Figure 3.5), Greece, Spain, Portugal (France) and 
Italy have the highest job strain (ibid., Figure 3.8) and, assuming a medium 
inequality aversion, Portugal, Spain, Greece (Austria) and Italy have the low- 
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est earnings quality (ibid., Figure 3.2B). Hence most GIISP countries have a 
remarkably high level of job insecurity and job strain and a remarkable low 
earnings quality. 
 
3. Active Inclusion and the Return to Full Employment 
 
It is important to understand how the welfare state in most European  
countries has developed in order to appreciate the emergence of the notion of 
inclusive labor markets and the potential role of job guarantee experiments 
therein. For that reason we briefly sketch in section 3.1 how the focus of the 
welfare state shifted from “full employment” in the first decades after WWII 
towards “full employability” since the mid-1980s. In section 3.2 we then 
argue that the notion of inclusive labor markets is on the one hand firmly 
rooted in the tradition of full employability, but also contains elements of a 
possible return to full employment. Finally we present in section 3.3 the job 
guarantee scheme as a possibility to enhance inclusive labor markets with a 
stronger emphasis on full employment. 
 
3.1 The shift from “full employment” to “full employability”10  
 
In Figure 13 we reproduce the Full Employment framework developed in 
Mitchell and Muysken (2008). It represents how the welfare state in most 
European countries in the decades after WWII was based on three main 
pillars. The Economic Pillar was defined by a serious commitment to full 
employment, which after the oil crises became blurred in the debate about 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The Redistributive Pillar 
was designed to amend market outcomes, motivating equity intervention by 
governments in the form of income support and wage setting norms. The 
Collective Pillar provided the philosophical underpinning for the Full Employ- 
ment framework, based on the intrinsic rights of citizenship and on solidarity. 
Mitchell and Muysken (2008) discuss at great length how the reforms 
initiated in the Reagan–Thatcher era in the mid-1980s had serious implications 
for social policies all over Europe and led to labor market reforms as advo- 
cated by the OECD’s “Jobs Study” (OECD, 1994). Mitchell and Muysken 
(2010) claim that, in the spirit of these reforms, the only way to resolve the 
pressures on the Redistributive Pillar was to reduce the public commitment to 
income support and the pursuit of equity. This shift in focus required a major 
recasting of the concept of citizenship which underpinned the Collective 
Pillar and had been an essential part of the rationale for the system of social 
security in the post-war period. Eventually, this development resulted in a 
shift from the “Full Employment” framework to the “Full Employability”  
framework – the latter is represented in Figure 14. 
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Figure 13 The Pillars of the Full Employment framework 
 
    Source: Mitchell and Muysken (2008: Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 14 The Full Employability framework 
 
   Source: Mitchell and Muysken (2008: Figure 1.3). 
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Under the “Full employability” framework collective will has been usurped by 
the primacy of the individual. Unemployment is seen as a problem of welfare 
dependence rather than a deficiency of jobs. As a consequence individuals 
now face broader obligations: they have to accept responsibility, be self-
reliant, and fulfill their obligations to society. In many countries reciprocal 
obligation was developed as a leading principle, aiming at reintegration in 
the labor market. That is the receipt of benefits is contingent on meeting 
behavioral criteria and providing services community – often in an almost 
punitive, disciplinary context.  
There are two major shortcomings in the full employability framework. 
First, the asymmetry in the reciprocal obligation is that the government does 
not have the obligation to ensure that there are enough jobs for all those 
wanting work. Second, the impact of macroeconomic circumstances on 
unemployment is not recognized: In times of a shortage of aggregate demand 
aggregate unemployment is inevitable. These shortcomings are modified by 
the introduction of the concept of inclusive labor markets as we argue below. 
 
3.2 Inclusive labor market policies 
 
The concept of inclusive labor markets was introduced as one of the strands 
of the EU Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2008 on the active 
inclusion of people excluded from the labor market. The Recommendation 
advocated an integrated active inclusion strategy based on three pillars:  
adequate income support, access to quality (social) services and inclusive 
labor markets. Member States were encouraged to develop and implement 
comprehensive policies built around the mutually reinforcing roles of each of 
the three strands. This approach gained gradual acceptance as a key reference 
point of the EU’s current approach towards combating poverty and social 
exclusion, which has been embedded in the inclusive growth pillar of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (Frazer and Marlier, 2010; Klosse, 2013; Natali, 2014). 
In the light of the discussion in the previous section, it is interesting to 
read carefully the following statement, derived from the EU Commission 
Recommendation on active inclusion:  
 
The persistence of poverty and joblessness and the growing com- 
plexities of multiple disadvantages call for comprehensive, integrated 
policies. With a view to modernizing social protection systems, 
adequate income support needs to be combined with a link to the 
labor market and access to quality services in an integrated active 
inclusion strategy. This strategy is fully complementary to  the 
flexicurity approach, while targeting those excluded from the labor 
market. It contributes to the Lisbon strategy by facilitating the  
activation and the mobility of the workforce, and represents a  
building block in the social dimension of the EU’s sustainable 
development strategy. 
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This statement reveals the ambivalent character of the active inclusion concept 
(Marlier and Natali, 2008). On the one hand, the Recommendation recognizes 
(a) the persistence of poverty and joblessness (although it does not link this 
to macroeconomic failures) and (b) the need of adequate income support and 
a link to the social dimension of the EU’s sustainable growth strategy. Both 
can be seen as steps towards the full employment framework. However, on 
the other hand, (c) the reference to the flexicurity approach and (d) the focus 
on activation and mobility of the workforce seem more in line with the full 
employability framework. This ambiguity is in line with the observation by 
Marchal and Van Mechelen (2015) that the Recommendation “aims to con- 
nect activation recipes to enhanced social protection and the broader set of 
welfare provisions aimed at social inclusion” (5).11 
The evaluation by Marchal and Van Mechelen on active inclusion in 
European minimum income schemes provides some further insights. They 
take the three pillars which constitute active inclusion policies, i.e. adequate 
income support, inclusive labor markets and access to affordable and quality 
services as point of departure for their analysis. They show how these three 
pillars can be used as a classification scheme in order to assess the variation 
in activation strategies pursued in EU member states. However, they argue that 
the inclusive activation strategy has two dimensions, which should be ex- 
plicitly distinguished. The first dimension has a focus on incentives to enhance 
participation in the labor market (with a strong focus on stimuli to lower the 
reservation wage). The second dimension emphasizes human capital formation 
(with a strong focus on education and vocational training). “It favors im- 
proving individual capacities, rather than inducing behavioral change” (Marchal 
and Van Mechelen, 2015: 4). Together these distinctions then amount to four 
aspects of social inclusion, summarized in the column headings of Table 1. 
Their general findings on each of the four aspects of active inclusion for 
20 countries are that most countries do not provide adequate income support. 
Also the provision of affordable services is not sufficient. This is consistent 
with our earlier observation of the shift away from the Full Employment 
Framework in the direction of the Full Employability Framework. The latter 
is also reflected in the more directly labor market related aspects of active 
inclusion. All countries show at least some adherence to the inclusive labor 
markets pillars, and generally, substantially so. Especially in the incentives 
sphere, most countries reach high membership scores, whereas membership 
scores in the enabling dimension are less outspoken (Marchal and Van 
Mechelen, 2015: 14). These findings are reflected in Table 1 for the coun- 
tries of the EU12 which Marchal and Van Mechelen studied.12 
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  Table 1 Scores on active inclusion labor market policies 
 Adequate income Enabling Incentives Services 
BE 0,20 0,75 0,84 0,82 
DE 0,26 0,75 0,57 0,43 
FI 0,38 0,87 0,34 0,55 
FR 0,00 0,75 1,00 0,13 
IT 0,00 0,50 1,00 0,45 
LU 0,51 0,75 0,84 0,27 
NL 0,81 0,50 0,67 0,36 
PT 0,00 0,47 0,97 0,00 
UK 0,39 0,50 1,00 0,00 
  Source: Marchal and Van Mechelen (2014: Table 7). 
 
Similar observations have been made in the evaluation of national policies 
on active inclusion by Frazer and Marlier (2013). They observe that, while 
there has been progress in some Member States, this is often uneven and 
partial. The effective implementation of the Recommendation across the EU 
is still far away. However, some progress has been made in designing and 
implementing active inclusion measures for those who can work than for those 
who cannot work. “As the impact of the economic and financial crisis has 
deepened and as an increased emphasis has been put on financial consoli- 
dation and austerity measures, resources have become tighter and the  
approach has tended to become (even) more unbalanced. A significant factor 
in many countries which has limited the implementation of an active inclu- 
sion approach has been the introduction of austerity measures in response to 
the economic and financial crisis” (Frazer and Marlier, 2013: 7 – see also 
Crepaldi et al., 2015). 
 
3.3 The notion of a Job Guarantee 
 
The previous sections 2.2 and 2.3 revealed the failure of the active inclusion 
policies to realize inclusive labor markets. In this section we present the idea 
of a job guarantee as an alternative route forward. The idea of a job guarantee 
stems from a long tradition in the USA. It was advocated by institutionalists, 
such as Copeland, Gordon and Minsky. In particular the latter introduced the 
role of the government as employer of last resort (ELR) – see Minsky (1965). 
This was taken up by Wray (1998) and has led to active groups based at the 
University of Missouri–Kansas City (Forstater, 1999; Tcherneva, 2005; Full- 
wiler, 2007) and at the Levy institute (Kregel, 2009; Godin, 2013; Papadi- 
mitriou et al., 2016) elaborating on ELR-policies. Around the same time 
Mitchell (1998) introduced the notion of a job guarantee in Australia. Bill 
Mitchell established a group in the Centre of Full Employment and Equity 
(CofFEE) at the University of Newcastle in Australia which is actively ad- 
vocating and developing Job Guarantee schemes (Quirk et al., 2006; Coffee, 
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2008; Watts, 2010; Juniper et al., 2014). All these groups are now coop- 
erating closely and have been joined by CofFEE-Europe based in Maastricht 
University, which amongst others inspired the present paper (see also Mitchell 
and Muysken, 2008; 2010). Without acknowledging links to these groups 
Atkinson (2015) has also embraced the ELR concept and proposed detailed 
plans to introduce ELR in Britain and in Europe.13 Finally, there have been 
various debates on the potential problems with introducing a JG-scheme – 
see for instance Aspromourgos (2000), King (2001), Palley (2001), Sawyer 
(2003; 2005) and Mitchell and Wray (2005) for a general debate and see 
Standing (2005; 2013), Noguchi (2013), Harvey (2005; 2013), Tcherneva and 
Wray (2005) and Tcherneva (2013) for a discussion in relation to basic income. 
We briefly summarize the main aspects of the Job Guarantee Scheme 
below, drawing heavily on Mitchell and Muysken (2008; 2010) to which we 
also refer for more details. The aim of the JG-scheme is to ban involuntary 
unemployment. For that reason the government ensures the availability of 
suitable public sector jobs at the statutory minimum wage level for anyone 
willing and able to work. In this way the scheme supports continuity of in- 
come and labor force attachment, without recourse to social welfare depen- 
dence. So instead of wielding a stick to force those on social welfare benefits 
to accept in many cases low quality work, it provides a carrot in the form of 
quality jobs. The scheme also provides appropriately structured training activ- 
ities on the job. As such, a properly designed Job Guarantee scheme can help 
previously unemployed persons to make transitions into careers in the private 
sector and also stimulate employers to modify their recruitment behavior. 
A Job Guarantee Scheme can also help to solve the problem of time-
related underemployment as it provides the opportunity for under-employed 
workers to engage in full time employment. In turn, this could place pressure 
on private sector employers, who have failed to provide sufficient hours of 
work to satisfy the preferences of their workforces, to restructure their work- 
places so as to overcome the discontent that their underemployed workers feel. 
As Mitchell and Muysken (2008) emphasize, the Job Guarantee idea is 
firmly embedded in the notion of full employment, which recognizes the 
basic right of every individual to “just and favorable conditions of work” as 
expressed in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and in the European 
Social Charter. It is also consistent with the notions of social cohesion, social 
inclusion and human dignity which are listed among the key values and aims 
of the EU (articles 2 and 3 Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The Job 
Guarantee idea should therefore be distinguished from proposals for a basic 
income. The problem with basic income is that societies do not automatically 
feel responsible for the wellbeing of persons they provide a basic income to. 
This might pose a threat to social cohesion. The basic income does not impose 
any responsibility on the individuals either and hence also might threaten 
human dignity. A more elaborate discussion, including macroeconomic con- 
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siderations, is provided in Mitchell and Watts (2004) – see also the references 
given above. 
Finally, as we elaborate below, using the job guarantee for the provision 
of collective goods and services might revive the public awareness of their 
importance and lead to a normal provision of these jobs. In that context, as is 
stressed in Mitchell and Muysken (2010), an appropriate Job Guarantee 
Scheme also acknowledges the strains on our natural ecosystems and the need 
to change the composition of final output towards environmentally sustainable 
activities. Environmental projects are ideal targets for public sector employ- 
ment initiatives as they are likely to be under-produced by the private sector 
due to their heavy public good component. If a portion of Job Guarantee jobs 
were used to repair and restore the environment, the workers would re-gain 
personal dignity, and society would gain from the increased provision of 
goods and services which support sustainability. It is not increased demand 
per se that is necessary but increased demand in sustainable areas of activity. 
From a macroeconomic perspective it is important to note that the JG-job 
will be paid according to the mandatory minimum wage, thus keeping the 
earnings below the prevailing wage on the labor market.14 The Job Guarantee 
acts as a job buffer, ensuring that there is full employment over the business 
cycle, while inflation is being kept under control. The Job Guarantee does not 
raise inflation even though there is no (involuntary) unemployment because 
the wage of the JG is below the market clearing wage. If there would be any 
inflationary pressure, the government could easily suppress this by tightening 
its fiscal and/or monetary policy. Since the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
the unemployment rate under a Job Guarantee Scheme would be much lower 
than the “ordinary” NAIRU, it would result in much less wastage of labor 
resources. All these arguments are elaborated in Mitchell and Muysken 
(2008). We discuss the financing of the JG in the next section, where we also 
discuss the various objections that have been raised in the discussions  
referred to above. 
 
4. Experiments with Job Guarantee Policies 
 
The overview of European labor markets in section 2 did show a gradual 
deterioration of job quality and an increase in work-in poverty, which we 
associated in section 3.2 with the shift from “full employment” to “full em- 
ployability.” The strong rise of unemployment after the financial crisis also 
exposed the lack of awareness of the full employability policies for macro- 
economic market failures. We argued in section 3.2 that inclusive labor market 
policies are a step in the right direction. However, we also observed that, due 
to the austerity measures implied by the financial crisis, the implementation of 
these policies stagnated. Moreover, the macroeconomic problem of deficient 
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demand still has to be tackled. The introduction of a Job Guarantee Scheme 
could help to solve both problems. It can generate both sustainable employ- 
ment in good quality jobs and an adequate income, and it tackles the problem 
of deficient demand by stimulating the economy. One might wonder, how- 
ever, whether this will really work out in this way in practice and how such a 
scheme should be implemented. These issues will be discussed below. We 
first summarize earlier experiences with Job Guarantee Schemes in section 
4.1. Then we elaborate on the implementation of Job Guarantee experiments 
in section 4.2, where we also discuss how one might deal with the problems 
raised in earlier discussions. In section 4.3 we discuss the financial implications. 
 
4.1 Earlier experiences with the Job Guarantee Scheme 
 
There have been some rather successful field experiments with the Job 
Guarantee Scheme in Argentine, South-Africa and India – see Mitchell and 
Muysken (2008, Ch. 9.6) for an overview. An interesting example is the Plan 
Jefes which was implemented in Argentina as a depression solution after the 
crisis in 2001. The Plan did run until 2008.  
Characteristic of the Plan Jefes was that it took workers “as they are.” 
Jobs were provided to heads of households (presumably male), but the intra-
household decisions in the majority of cases designated the woman as the 
head of the household. In 2005, almost 75% of the participants who turned 
up for work were women. There were no skills means tests and men and 
women were offered employment into community projects irrespective of  
their past labor market experience, level of education, or skills. The govern- 
ment had estimated that 500,000 persons would show up for work, whereas, 
at its peak, Jefes had hired 2 million persons (Tcherneva, 2012: 8). 
As Tcherneva shows, Plan Jefes provided the predicted macroeconomic 
stabilization effects and established a wage floor for those workers who 
transitioned from the Jefes program to private sector work. Not surprisingly 
almost 93% of Jefes workers who were hired into private firms were offered 
a wage above the Jefes wage. The majority of Jefes projects provided useful 
community work. In some cases, the projects literally transformed commu- 
nities.  
 
Projects included improvements in the water supply, sewer systems, 
and pluvial networks. They made investments in health and  
educational infrastructure, improved hydraulic defenses, clay pits, 
municipal slaughter houses, recreational and tourist areas, and many 
others. In many instances, Jefes funds were used as seed money by 
the unemployed to launch their own businesses and micro-
enterprises, some of which made toys from recyclable materials, 
others manufactured clothing for the domestic or export market or 
set up carpentry and other artisanal shops (Tcherneva, 2012: 14). 
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In India, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) started 
in 2005. It entitles every rural household in India to a minimum of 100 days 
of paid work per year. This is an unrestricted entitlement with no eligibility 
requirements. Employment in the scheme increased, spreading out over rural 
areas, from 21 million households in 2006–07 to 33.9 million households in 
2007–08 and 53 million households in 2010–11. Anzar (2012) finds that 
NREGA has a positive impact on the labor force participation, mainly driven 
by increased female participation. He also finds a significant positive impact 
on the wages of female casual workers – real wages of 8%, and a modest 
impact on wages of casual male workers of 1%. Other positive evaluations 
are provided by Deininger and Liu (2013) and Imbert and Papp (2015). The 
experiments in India have expanded over time and still continue with success.  
We are not aware of Job Guarantee experiments in Western economies. A 
Dutch program most closely resembling the job-guarantee was the Melkert-
jobs program started in 1994. On an annual basis 40 to 60 thousand additional 
public sector jobs were created, paid by the government. This program was 
one of the few activation programs that aimed “at participation in a wider 
sense than labor-market integration only.”15 (van Berkel and de Scham- 
peleire, 2001: 33). Although its name changed to “ID-Jobs” in 1999, this 
program essentially ran from 1994 until it was cancelled in 2004 – see also 
Stiller and van Gerven (2012). An interesting aspect of the Melkert jobs was 
that they generated many collective services which were canceled due to 
austerity measures. The cancellation of these jobs then led to a deterioration 
in these services which was generally felt as a loss. This latter point is  
clearly recognized by Atkinson (2015, Ch. 5): JG jobs create genuinely 
valuable output and should not be evaluated solely on the subsequent labor 
market success of participants. 
Two examples of mistaken interpretations of the JG approach are the “Job 
Guarantee” proposed in Layard (2009) and the “EU Youth Guarantee Scheme” 
launched in 2013 (EU, 2012). The first scheme only provides temporary 
solutions for long-term unemployed young persons. The second scheme seeks 
to reduce the risk of long-term unemployment amongst young people by in- 
ducing the Member States to ensure that all young people under 25 – whether 
registered with employment services or not – receive a concrete and good-
quality offer for a job, apprenticeship, traineeship, or continued education 
within 4 months after leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. It 
is too early to evaluate the success of the scheme, but the first indications are 
not very positive due to a serious lack of funding and jobs of sufficient  
quality as reported by both the European Court of Auditors (2015) and 
Escuardo and Morello (2015). “The overwhelming problem with the Youth 
Guarantee proposal is that it skirts around the main issue, a lack of jobs. It 
continues the emphasis on full employability …. What is needed in Europe 
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is a large scale job creation program for those who are not in formal edu- 
cation or formal apprenticeship programs” (Mitchell, 2015: 440). 
 
4.2 Implementing job guarantee experiments 
 
One should always adhere to the spirit of full employment – see section 3.1 
above – when implementing a Job Guarantee Scheme. That is, one should aim 
at sustainable employment in quality jobs, in line with personal capacities 
and not stigmatizing individuals or groups. A detailed proposal of how to 
implement a JG scheme within the Australian context has been developed in 
Quirk et al. (2006) and CofFEE (2008: Ch. 13) – see also Atkinson (2015: 
Ch. 8) for a proposal consistent with the British situation. Both proposals 
rely heavily on the existing administrative structure and imply a relatively 
large bureaucracy. That may be a drawback of the JG scheme which is in- 
evitable (Noguchi, 2013; Standing, 2013), although this bureaucracy is also 
present in the current social benefits system. 
For that reason we also encourage local initiatives and exchange of  
experiences – see also Klosse and Muysken (2014). This means that within a 
country each municipality or neighborhood and each individual could come 
up with a concrete proposal for work under the Job Guarantee Scheme.16 Each 
reasonable proposal should be tried out, within limits, and terminated when 
it turns out to be a failure. Thus, one can learn from both the successes and 
the failures of others. Successful experiments may then be implemented on a 
larger scale and learning from each other should be encouraged. 
It is very well possible to involve the social partners (trade unions and 
employers) in the implementation of a Job Guarantee Scheme. It might thus 
become a public-private-partnership.17 There might also be a relationship 
with activities on the shop floor, such as training – see Gerards, Muysken 
and Welters (2012) for a successful experiment with a large company in the 
Netherlands. One should realize, however, that training and education are 
not a panacea for all evils. As long as there is a shortage of jobs, training is 
paramount to stirring a cup of tea. But training within a paid employment 
context, created by the Job Guarantee Scheme or other forms of sustainable 
employment, helps to overcome churning unemployed through the current 
active labor market policies: there always has to be the prospect of a job after 
training. In that context, it is important to involve employers in the Scheme, 
since they can contribute strongly to creating trainee posts. Also the employers 
should realize that training on the job will strengthen the motivation of the 
worker and will probably yield a higher return (Voegtlin et al., 2015). Initial 
good matching is an essential ingredient in that respect (Maguire, 2015). 
Vital is furthermore that employers are encouraged to create suitable employ- 
ment opportunities for vulnerable groups, using concepts like “job crafting” 
and, more in particular “tasks differentiation” (Van der Klink et al., 2014; 
 207 
Parker, 2014). Finally, ageing of the population also emphasizes the signif- 
icance of sustainable employment (Cloostermans et al., 2015).  
A relevant question is crowding out of private and public sector jobs 
(Sawyer, 2005; Noguchi, 2013). There are four aspects to this. First of all it 
is very hard to argue whether crowding out takes place or not. One could 
argue that when there is no vacancy for a certain job, employing a person in 
JG-job to do the relevant work implies no crowding out – an example would 
be a janitor at a primary school which has neither a janitor nor a vacancy for 
that position. This criterion is often used in the Netherlands (Klosse and 
Muysken, 2014). One can object to this criterion that previously existing jobs 
then might be terminated and replaced by relatively cheap JG-employees 
without posting a formal vacancy. This is indeed a problem that should be 
recognized and requires careful monitoring, also with help of social partners 
– see also CofFEE (2008: Ch. 13) and Atkinson (2015: Ch. 8) for more 
detailed proposals.  
Second, implicit in many JG-proposals is the notion that as is explicitly 
discussed in Noguchi (2013) there is a general lack of public goods and 
services nowadays, which can very well be provided by JG-jobs. However, 
if the cycle goes up persons employed in these “indispensable” JG-jobs are 
drawn into the private market, which leaves an irreplaceable void (Sawyer, 
2004). Mitchell and Wray (2004) argue that there can be a hard core of  
deficient aggregate demand which then can be use to fill these jobs, but that 
is not very clear. One might hope that the provision of these goods and ser- 
vices revives the public awareness of their importance and leads to a normal 
provision of these jobs (Noguchi, 2013; Atkinson, 2015). 
Third, one should realize that some alleged crowding out is part of labor 
market dynamics. For instance, Imbert and Papp (2015) show that in India’s 
rural areas part of the JG-jobs crowd out private sector jobs, leading to an 
increase of the private sector wage. They show that this increases  overall 
welfare.  
Fourth, some private sector jobs might offer such unfavorable conditions 
that employees will prefer to work in JG-jobs. In that case the Job Guarantee 
provides a minimum standard for job quality which should be recognized as 
worthwhile and forces private employers to obey that standard (Mitchell and 
Wray, 2004; Mitchell, 2015). 
 
4.3 How to finance job guarantee experiments 
 
A final question is how to finance job guarantee experiments. In Mitchell  
and Muysken (2008) it is explained that from a macroeconomic perspective 
there should be no objection to finance Job Guarantee policies by issuing 
money by the Central Bank. This is has always been highly controversial and 
branded JG proposals as completely unrealistic.  
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However, central bank funding is not necessary to start experimenting 
with Job Guarantee initiatives as the experiments described in section 4.1 
have shown. A lot of funds spent on social benefits and the administration 
system can be redirected to Job Guarantee projects (CofFEE, 2008: Ch. 13; 
Atkinson, 2015: Ch. 8). Next to that, the European Commission has recently 
launched “An investment plan for Europe” in which it proposes to invest at 
least EUR 315 billion in the European economy by 2017.18 This plan, also 
known as the “Juncker plan,” can very well be used to incorporate JG-jobs – 
for instance by requiring that 5% of each investment is spent on employing 
persons belonging to vulnerable groups (Social Return).  
Moreover, one should realize that the ECB is currently injecting €80 billion 
in the Euro Area each month (amounting to over 8% of GDP on an annual 
basis) and recently has extended that QE program. This measure has been 
strongly criticized for many reasons, but we focus here on the argument that 
by providing the injection through bond purchasing programs, there is a 
threat of a new asset bubble of which only the already wealthy persons will 
profit. This objection inspired Muellbauer (2014) to propose that the ECB 
hands out a check to every euro area citizen in stead of buying bonds – that 
would have better distributional consequences in his view. We share Muell- 
bauer’s objection, but think that handing out a cheque to every euro area  
citizen also has questionable distributional consequences. Using (part of) this 
money to finance Job Guarantee projects would be in line with the macro- 
economic analysis in Mitchell and Muysken (2008) and would directly 
stimulate the economy in the strongest possible way. It could also provide 
additional capacity to the large investment plan of the European Com- 
mission. The latter is in line with the proposal of the Grauwe (2016) who 
argues that “while QE was and is necessary, it is insufficient. It has to be 
seconded by fiscal policies, …, it is precisely public investment that is key to 
the recovery in the euro zone. … our grandchildren will ask us why we did 
not invest in alternative energy and public transportation, and thereby made 
their lives miserable, when we faced historically favorable financial conditions 
to do so.”19 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
From our analysis of the European labor market we learned that there is a 
clear scope for improvement in activity rates when comparing different 
countries, although one should recognize the variation in underlying reasons 
for inactivity when proposing improvements for different countries. This 
implies a distinct role for active inclusion policies. However, these policies 
should be complemented by stimulating macroeconomic policies since there 
has been a strong increase in unemployment, in particular in the GIISP 
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countries, due to a fall in aggregate demand. This problem is exacerbated by 
the observation that there is probably an interaction between inactivity and 
unemployment, leading to hidden unemployment.  
Active inclusion policies are also warranted by the observation that  
sustainable employment is impeded by the pervasiveness of temporary work, 
self-employment and part-time work. The incidence of temporary work and 
part time work has increased systematically and is often accepted due to a 
lack of better jobs. Although self-employment is relatively stable at 15% of 
total employment, the vulnerable group of own-account workers amongst 
them has increased. Moreover the share of “work at risk of poverty” jobs has 
increased, in particular amongst foreigners, low educated persons and young- 
sters – who also have a high incidence of inactivity and unemployment. 
Finally most GIISP countries have a remarkably high level of job insecurity 
and job strain and a remarkable low earnings quality. 
Against this background we deplore that the implementation of active 
inclusion policies, initiated in 2008, never really took off and stagnated due 
to the austerity measures enforced after the financial crisis. For that reason 
we propose to experiment with job guarantee (JG) projects, which on the one 
hand should provide a macroeconomic stimulus to the economy by employ- 
ing everybody who is out of work in Job Guarantee jobs at the minimum 
wage. On the other hand by providing quality jobs and sustainable employ- 
ment, also encouraging local initiatives, the downward trend in job quality 
observed by the OECD Employment Outlook can be stopped and inclusive 
labor markets will be fostered. We propose for that reason to finance the Job 
Guarantee Scheme by redirecting social security (administration) funds, by 
including Job Guarantee elements in the European Investment Plan (also 
known as the Juncker Plan) and to spend part of the €80 billion which the 
ECB is currently injecting each month in the euro area on job guarantee 
projects. 
We should keep in mind the finding of OECD that “across countries it 
does not appear to be the case that better job quality is achieved at the cost of 
fewer jobs. Countries that perform well in terms of overall job quality also 
tend to perform well on job quantity (as measured by the employment rate), 
and vice versa” (OECD, 2014: 32).20 This should be an additional stimulus 
to experiment with job guarantee projects. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Retrieved from the definition of inclusive labor markets on the EU web site:  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1134&langId=en 
2. The EU12 consists of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The 
EU15 also includes Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The data used in this section are 
taken from Eurostat. 
3. These groups are “Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education 
(ISCED levels 0–2)” and “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educa- 
tion (levels 3 and 4),” respectively. 
4. A similar phenomenon is reported for long-term unemployment in Appendix 
B. 
5. For instance OECD (2014: 21–22) claims “OECD estimates of the NAIRU 
(Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) suggest that it has tended to  
increase since the start of the crisis in several OECD countries and particularly in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain.” However, the OECD also recognizes that in most 
countries “Weak aggregate demand accounts for a significant part of the persistence 
of high unemployment.” For a critical assessment of the OECD approach to the  
NAIRU we refer to Mitchell and Muysken (2008). We also show in Appendix B 
how the wage share in national income has decreased for the GIIPS countries till the 
financial crisis – except for the case of Greece, which has an exceptionally low wage 
share, however. The small upturn after the financial crisis in some countries is due to 
lagged adjustment of employment. 
6. In this section we mainly refer to the OECD (2014) findings, since the OECD 
provides a comprehensive overview and can hardly be seen as a source which is 
biased in favor of emphasizing problematic labor market outcomes. 
7. The notion that a probationary period leads to a permanent job is often  
mistaken as is indicated in OECD (2014, Ch. 4). 
8. An interesting overview for several countries is presented in Eichhorst et al. 
(2013). 
9. This threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable 
income (after social transfers). 
10. This section relies heavily on Mitchell and Muysken (2008; 2010) – see also 
Judt (2010) and Atkinson (2015) for similar observations. 
11. The same ambiguity is also visible in Guideline 10 of the Europe 2020 
Integrated Guidelines on promoting social inclusion and combating poverty: COM 
2010, 193 final. See Klosse (2013: 506). 
12. In order to include one Scandinavian country, we included also Finland. 
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13. Mitchell (2015, Ch. 23) also mentions the Job Guarantee scheme as a  
possible solution for the European problems, but he is quite pessimistic about the 
possibilities to implement it due to diverging political views. 
14. The minimum wage should be such that a full time job at the minimum wage 
does not lead to in-work poverty. 
15. The authors continue: “It involves promoting participation in unpaid  
activities such as voluntary or community work. This ‘route’ towards inclusion has 
hardly been developed in active social policies.” A similar observation is made in 
Ochel (2005).  
16. Some examples of possible activities are: (1) informal care for elderly people 
(e.g., transport, courses, helping with ICT); (2) refurbishing the neighborhood (e.g., 
playgrounds, green areas, a neighborhood platform); (3) designing and developing 
inner-city plans (banishing cars, reducing energy consumption). See CofFEE (2008) 
for an extensive list of activities, based on interviews with local community workers. 
17. However, we are quite wary of PPP’s since the partners often have asym- 
metric positions. 
18. See Commission document COM (2014) 903 of 26.11.2014. 
19. To be fair, de Grauwe (2016) definitely does not propose a JG-scheme and his 
implicit proposal for using the QE-program to finance public investments is confined 
to “countries, like Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.” There is a fierce 
discussion on the alleged financing of JG-programs by “printing money” between 
adepts of Modern Modern Theory (MMT) and its opponents – see Mitchell (2015, 
Ch. 21) for further references. 
20. See also the observation by de Grauwe (2016): “European authorities have  
put great emphasis on structural reforms to boost long-term economic growth. 
Econometric analysis of the relation between long-term growth and structural 
reforms (see IMF, 2015, and De Grauwe & Ji, 2015) suggests that these reforms have 
a weak effect on growth. These same studies, however, reveal that public and private 
investments are far more important to boost economic growth.” 
21. Main reason for not seeking employment: (1) Retired; (2) Own illness or 
disability; (3) Looking after children or incapacitated adults and other family or  
personal responsibilities; (4) In education or training. 
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